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“In the Beginning”… an Intermedial Babel 
Karin Littau 
 
I think in images. Poems help me to do this.1 
Am Anfang 
In the Beginning was a major exhibition of Anselm Kiefer’s work at the 
Bundeskunsthalle in Bonn in 2012. The exhibition included, among other works, 
several large-scale lead book sculptures, and featured Bavel Balal Mabul (2012),2 an 
installation filling an entire room and bringing together many of Kiefer’s key themes: 
mythology, memory, and history; apocalypse, regeneration, and transformation. It 
shows the tower of Babel in the shape of a spiral staircase-like-structure, spanning 
from floor (the Earth) to ceiling (the Heavens). Tumbling down the metal stairs are 
picture rolls that gather at the bottom of the tower like the wastage on the cutting 
room floor of a photographer’s or a movie editor’s suite. If we look more closely, we 
notice that these ribbons of paper are each composed of multiple black and white 
photographs.3 Strung together, the photographs are like a film reel. Each photograph 
depicts a tower and as a reel they show towers at various stages of (de)composition. 
The images come from other gigantic installations Kiefer created, including the 
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architectural landscape of concrete towers molded from shipping containers at his 
studio in Bajac, France.  
 
The very name of the Bonn sculpture captures the confusion of languages 
associated with the Babel myth. The name “babel” (לבב) is a mingling of the letters 
from the word “balal” (ללב), which in Hebrew means to mix or to confound, while 
“mabul” (לובמ) is the Hebrew word for flood. The work itself is a mesh of different 
materials and media: a mixed media sculpture of steel, lead, and photopaper. Bavel 
Balal Mabul is one of several of Kiefer’s reworkings of the Babel myth and a title he 
has used for another sculpture exhibited in Milan in 2012 in the form of a printing 
press. From this press spill out a tangle of photopapers, which like their Bonn 
counterpart depict various towers. Juxtaposed here is an old technology (print) and a 
new technology (photography; film).4 It is as if Kiefer is drawing our attention to 
Marshall McLuhan’s famous dictum that “the ‘content’ of any medium is always 
another medium” (15-16). The content of film is photography, the content of 
photography is painting, or in Kiefer’s case, the content of the sculpture is print and 
film and the content of the photo stills are sculptures.  
 
As the spectator moves around the Bonn installation and takes in its details, 
the eyes must zoom in on the stills of the picture rolls. Only then can we see the 
details of the towers. When we step back, zoom out so to speak, we take in the work 
as a whole, albeit only ever from the partial perspective of where we are standing in 
relation to the sculpture. While the work is static, simulating movement only in the 
tumbling of photopaper rolls uncurling across the gallery floor, our movements as 
spectators around the sculpture, coming closer and stepping back, put the work in 
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motion for us. Intermediality here is not only a descriptor for a multi-media artwork 
like Bavel Balal Mabul, it is also a descriptor of our engagement with it. More than 
that, intermediality is what this work is arguably about. In the beginning was 
intermediality. Kiefer’s sculpture is the starting point of this essay, because it brings 
together the three areas I want to explore: mediality, intermediality, and translation.  
 
Intermedial Translation 
 Roman Jakobson argued that interlingual (as opposed to intralingual or 
intersemiotic) translation defined the study of “translation proper” (233).5 In the 
1990s many translation theorists argued that formalist approaches of this kind tended 
to overlook the importance of culture as a unit of translation, and therefore proposed 
intercultural translation as a renewed way of thinking about translation.6 I would like 
to add intermedial translation to this already growing taxonomy, not least because 
interlingual and intercultural studies of translation have largely been blind to the 
extent to which mediality is an underlying condition – one might say the a priori – of 
all cultural output and cultural transfer. This necessitates that we take into 
consideration not only the particularities and materialities of the medium, or edition, 
from which and into which a given work is translated, but also inquire into the ways 
in which successive media technologies such as print, cinema, and computer have 
arguably engendered new material and aesthetic practices of translation. Intermedial 
translation – whether between media cultures, from one discrete medium into another, 
or within a given medium – is not therefore translation improper or marginal to 
Translation Studies, but vital to its remit in the twenty-first century: to understand the 
changing role of human communication in an age of rapid technological change.  
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Elsewhere I addressed the constitutive role that technologies have played in 
the history of translation in the media contexts of oral, scribal, print, and digital 
cultures.7 Drawing on insights from historians of the book, who have shown how 
practices of writing and reading have varied historically in accordance with the 
material forms available for the storage and retrieval of information, I asked whether 
these insights are also applicable in the context of translation. If it is the case that 
material carriers (electricity, human body, tablet, scroll, codex, book, computer) and 
their hardware (voice, clay, wax, papyrus, parchment, vellum, paper, screen) 
transformed practices of writing and reading, as Robert Darnton, Roger Chartier, and 
others have demonstrated, 8 then, surely, the same carriers and hardware also make a 
difference to translation. After all, translation partakes in very material ways of both 
writing and reading. To what extent then do translations bear the traces of their 
particular technological environment, be this performance-based, artisanal, industrial, 
electronic, or digital? Did translators translate differently before the codex was 
introduced as the main vehicle for preserving and transmitting writing? In what ways 
did the invention of print revolutionize practices of translation? How has the 
computer altered the practice and theory of translation? My aim, in showing how 
translation changed over the course of history in accordance with the material and 
technical resources at its disposal, was to throw new light on age-old debates about 
word-for-word and sense-for-sense translation.  
 
For this essay, I want to focus on the mediascape of the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first century, where the shift from print to image dominated media 
technologies have been felt most keenly. Of course this is not itself a new but rather a 
repeated phenomenon, constitutive of a media archaeology supporting the history of 
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cultural expression. In particular, I want to examine how the medium of film has left 
its marks on translation. Recent research in film and literature has shown how cinema 
has affected literature’s self-understanding, not least because film has given rise to a 
host of new literary forms of expression, frequently referred to as cinematic or filmic 
literature.9 I am thinking here of the self-conscious borrowings of filmic techniques, 
especially montage, in works by John Dos Passos and Alfred Döblin; the parallel, 
converging interests of literary modernism and cinema in poems by T. S. Eliot or 
Blaise Cendrars and prose fictions by Virginia Woolf or H.D.; and the appropriations 
in postmodern fictions, by among others, Thomas Pynchon and Angela Carter, of 
qualities so readily associated with cinema, such as surface, depthlessness, and 
simulation. If film has productively transformed, even invigorated, literary practice, 
might this not also be the case with regard to literary translation? In what ways has 
film shaped the material and aesthetic practices of translation? For instance, what 
kinds of filmic techniques have been absorbed into poetry translations in book-form 
or for online e-translations? How are we to understand the allusions to film and film 
culture in translations based on originals that were composed before film was even 
invented? My aim in exploring these questions, is firstly to demonstrate that media 
shape minds or “mindsets,” and secondly to show, through two specific instances, 
how translation too is affected by what Thomas Elsaesser has called the “cinema in 
our heads” (107). The two examples of what might be called filmic translations are: 
Christopher Logue’s War Music (2001) freely translated from the Illiad and Norbert 
Hummelt’s 2008 translation into German of T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922). By 
filmic translation I do not mean adaptation, the transposition from literature into film, 
or vice versa. 10 Rather, I mean the way in which translation has adapted to film 
culture. 
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Here, I want to take seriously Bertolt Brecht’s claim from 1931 that “The film 
viewer reads stories differently. But the person who writes stories is for his part also a 
film viewer” (113). The translator does of course both. She or he reads an original in 
one language and writes it down in another. Logically, then, the person who translates 
literature in the age of screen culture is not only shaped by a bibliographic but also by 
a cinematic imagination. Made in the context of a discussion of the ways in which old 
media (books) are affected by the arrival of new ones (films), and cannot exist 
alongside them unchanged, Brecht’s claim is an early acknowledgement of how 
media compete and adapt to one another. It is also one of the first articulations of 
intermediality, that is, the idea that media bear one another’s traces, and are 
impoverished if they are treated in isolation from one another. Another direct address 
of this issue is found three decades later in the aforementioned McLuhan’s quote from 
Understanding Media (1964). As McLuhan elaborates: “The content of writing is 
speech, just as the written word is the content of print, and print is the content of the 
telegraph” (14-15). Later in the book he relates this directly to film: “The content of a 
movie is a novel or a play or an opera” (26). On the one hand, this suggests that an 
older medium lives on in a newer medium and is therefore not supplanted; on the 
other hand, as McLuhan also insists, this means that the content of a medium, say the 
story of a given film, is less important than the message of the medium. And this 
message is “that media as extensions of our senses institute new ratios, not only 
among our private senses, but among themselves, when they interact among 
themselves” (63).11 This point is crucial to an understanding of media change and the 
effects of media on the human sensorium. It explains how the economies of scale of 
the printing press, the sensory barrage of motion pictures, or the instantaneity of 
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networked computing have impacted on our senses, perception, and cognition. In turn, 
it explains how our forms of expression and cultural outputs – which include 
translation – are shaped by the media ecology which thinking bodies inhabit. That 
there is no thinking or thought that is not consequent upon some medium, can be 
summed up in one word: mediality. 
 
Mediality 
The late twentieth-century preoccupation in Media Studies with popular 
culture, representation studies, and ideology critique has given way to a media-
philosophical discourse about the role of technology in human evolution that now 
propels a significant amount of research in the Humanities more generally. With its 
coupling of the human and the technological, this version of media study takes its cue 
from Canadian and German media theory, in particular, McLuhan and Friedrich 
Kittler, who takes from McLuhan the idea that “media,” as Kittler puts it “determine 
our situation.”12  While mediality has become a core concern in recent Anglo-
American media theory,13 little has been said outside of French- and German-
speaking media scholarship about its correlate term: intermediality. 14  There is, 
however, a pressing historical and theoretical imperative for treating both concepts 
together. If we accept McLuhan’s point that “the ‘content’ of any medium is always 
another medium” (emphasis added), that is to say, that media “remediate” each other, 
to use Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin’s term,15 it follows that intermediality is 
as old as media themselves. Arguably therefore, the concept of mediality presupposes 
an a priori intermediality. 
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     Figure 1        Figure 2 
 
In order to explore this claim more concretely, I will focus on a number of 
images that are mediated reconstructions of thought-worlds, which we might call 
“mind-sets.” As Kittler has shown in Optical Media (2010) there is a “historical 
tendency to employ technical media as models or metaphors for imagining the human 
or the soul” (35). This is evident in the ways in which mind has variously been 
described as a wax tablet (Plato), a blank sheet of paper (Locke), a palimpsest (de 
Quincey), or camera obscura (Leibniz).16 In Figures 1 and 2, for instance, the mind is 
conceived as “bookish,” and therefore clearly the product of writing and print culture. 
Giuseppe Arcimboldo’s painting The Librarian (ca. 1566) and the cover from the 
glossy magazine Stern (14 October 2004) entitled “Do you remember?” invoke the art 
of memory and how we access it; here, aided by the indexed book or library which 
makes information easily retrievable. These images also imply that the imagination is 
bibliographic. It is as if both images embrace what Kant warned of, namely, to make 
one’s “head into a parchment.”17  
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Figure 3       Figure 4 
 
Contrastively, Figures 3 and 4 represent the mind in proto-cinematic terms, 
thus undermining the assumption that the contemporary thought-world is dominated 
by print culture. Fritz Kahn’s “The Act of Seeing” (1926) first published in the year 
that silent film was first challenged by the talkies shows a mind that has internalized 
the cinematic apparatus. That “filmic perception”18 has pervaded all aspects of our 
thinking is also evident in Figure 4, which is a visual representation of a “new 
advance in brain/machine interface,” according to Bryner, that “could enable 
scientists to one day decode what a person is thinking simply by monitoring brain cell 
activity”. As the study co-author Moran Cerf, a computational neuroscientist at 
UCLA, told TechNewsDaily: “Now we actually are able to read people’s mind, on a 
very small subset of things, but you can still read their minds.”19 By using an iconic 
still of Marilyn Monroe from the movie The Seven Year Itch (1955), Figure 4 shows 
us a movie-minded head realized as a neurophysiological cinema;20 it also however 
displays this mind in transition: a mind at once mediated by photography and motion 
pictures, and plugged into a computer.  
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Figure 5        Figure 6 
 
The cyborg connotations of Figure 4 are graphically realized in Figures 5 and 
6,21 where mind has updated to a computer. Mind here is no longer bookish or 
cinematic but “computerish,” as if to enact Lev Manovich’s point that “the 
computerization of culture” (14) has pervaded all aspects of our thinking. These 
brains resemble the circuits of electronic media, remediated via the medium of 
another, older technology, namely x-rays. The shift from book-head to cinema-mind 
to computer-brain, and finally in Figure 6 to a virtual reality simulated non-human 
android suggests, firstly, that cognitive functions such as thought and memory are 
successively remodeled in accordance with a historically specific medium and, 
secondly, that as technologies multiply, so do our models for understanding the mind. 
This raises three related questions. Firstly, is the psyche only ever shaped by the latest 
technologies? Does a brain suddenly stop being “bookish-minded” with the birth of 
the motion pictures and has mind now irrevocably transformed from a “motion 
picture” into a “computer”? Secondly, therefore, are the inner workings of the mind as 
medium-specific or mono-medial as these metaphors suggest? And thirdly, what does 
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it entail for the humanities (or the Geisteswissenschaften) to say that mind or spirit 
(Geist) is “spoken” by technology?  
 
What is explicit in Figure 5, although implicit in the other figures with the 
exception of the Arcimboldo painting, is that the inner workings of the mind can only 
be made externally visible by recourse to an unseen technology. The heads, each with 
its own “mind-set,” may appear to show a simple linear relation between a given 
technology and habits of thought; however, the heads are possible only on the basis of 
a technology that enframes them but is not figured in them. That technology is the x-
ray or the CT scan, because it allows us to look into the inside of the head. In 
consequence, the head is not the environment in which mono-medial relations to 
thought are played out; but rather, is environed by multiple media in which the head 
merely counts as one more medium, albeit an older one. 
 
The idea that media technologies are internalized by the mind, or as Walter 
Ong put it, have been “interiorized, incorporated into mental processes themselves” 
(172), and in consequence shape thinking, how thinking itself thinks of thinking, and 
how thinking thinks about the human brain, presents a serious challenge to humanism 
and its tendency to put the human at the center of all things. In media-philosophical 
terms this is best encapsulated by Friedrich Nietzsche’s observation (1882) about his 
typewriter: “Our writing instruments also work on our thoughts” (172). This suggests 
that our instruments, tools, and media change not only the ways in which we write, or 
translate, but also the matter, form and content of this writing. Tools therefore are not 
merely a support system, or a prosthetic or “extension of man,” as Marx, Bergson, 
and McLuhan all argued, but determine the “enframing” to which what we assume to 
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be separable content is, as it were, a priori subject. This is where Nietzsche’s point 
differs from Heidegger’s in the latter’s essay on “The Question Concerning 
Technology.” 22  This enframing, or engulfing without awareness, is the root of 
Heidegger’s concern, rather than some luddite protest against telephony or Sputnik.23 
The logic of Nietzsche’s insight is this: if tools work on our thoughts it follows that 
the thought of the separability of tool from thought is itself the work of those tools. 
We cannot think without tools or outside of them; they environ thought and mediate it 
accordingly.  
 
This line of thinking suggests a radical rethinking of mental worlds. As David 
Wellbery sums up Kittler’s project, which is derived from Nietzsche’s observation 
about his typewriter and which he uses as a deliberate provocation to the 
Geisteswissenschaften in general and the Medienwissenschaften in particular: it is not 
Geist but media that “set the framework within which something like ‘meaning,’ 
indeed, something like ‘man,’ become possible at all” (xii).24 In other words, media 
are central to the production of culture and their self-understandings. They give a 
body to the mind’s labors, and make it possible to take these labors out into the world 
to be shared by others. Without media, the labors of human imagination could neither 
be stored nor transported or transmitted. Crucially then media do more than merely 
serve (they are not just neutral bearers of social, artistic or constructive meaning) and 
do more than merely conserve (they are not just storage systems): they are 
constitutive of the cultural memory and practices they store. They think for us and as 
us (not with us) when we write, read, and translate. As media historians Aleida and 
Jan Assmann (1990) explain: 
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Everything that can be known, thought and said about the world is only 
knowable, thinkable, and sayable dependently upon the media that 
communicate this knowing. [...] It is not the language in which we think, but 
the media in which we communicate that model our world. (2, my translation) 
 
This displacement of the centrality of language to the modeling of the world is 
nothing other than a displacement of one medium by another. It is a displacement of 
the medium of language by other, technological media and a displacement of the 
poststructuralist claim that we are spoken by language and that we cannot think 
outside language. And yet, as McLuhan has taught us, a new medium always assumes 
functions presupposed to be specific to the old medium it supplants, and the sense of 
ourselves it supported. Accordingly if, as Nietzsche noted and McLuhan would 
concur, media act – via the sensoria they serve to complexify – on our thinking, the 
thinking this produces must also act in thinking about these media. If media model the 
world, then the writing of media history, or any history, including the history of 
translation, is never not touched by the media that shape thinking.  
 
If mediality is a priori, as I have suggested with reference to the metaphors of 
mind above, it is also historical. Therefore, if mediality – to borrow Michel Foucault’s 
term – is an “historical a priori” (126), we are facing a paradox. An a priori is by 
definition prior; if historical then it cannot be prior, for this would imply that it is 
variable. If all that a priori means is that it is first, then adding “historical” to it, is 
adding nothing, since by definition anything following the first would be historical. 
This is why it must mean something else. The paradox then is this: being prior, 
although itself historically variant, does not for that reason unseat the prior from the 
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position of being precisely prior. Foucault’s point therefore is not “because historical 
therefore not a priori” but rather: “both historically variant and nevertheless a priori”. 
In the context of mediality this suggests that if both – historically variant and 
nevertheless a priori – then the historical succession of variant media together 
constitute an intermedial a priori, i.e. one that cannot be reduced to a single medium 
such as thought, print, film, computer, etc.  
 
“Filmic” Translation 
Writing and the literary arts are the products of material conditions; however, 
these material conditions are not reducibly social but as Marx suggests in 1857/8, they 
are also technological and medial.  
 
Is Achilles possible with powder and lead? Or the Illiad with the printing 
press, not to mention the printing machine? Do not the song and the saga and 
the muse necessarily come to an end with the printer’s bar, hence do not the 
necessary conditions of epic poetry vanish? (111) 
 
Marx is articulating a series of questions that go to the heart of the issues so far 
discussed, namely that when material conditions change, so do our cultures’ outputs. 
With reference to translation this means, for instance, that although Pope’s age no 
longer produced its own song and saga, Pope was nevertheless able to translate the 
Illiad into verse, drawing fully on the poetic resources of his time. In a century 
dominated by media like film, however, this kind of translation, as Reynolds has 
pointed out, is out of tune. And yet, this is the challenge that Logue’s Illiad 
translation, War Music, meets head-on, but “in the opposite way,” according to 
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Reynolds: “In order to write a long poem deriving from Homer, he adopts the tactics 
of those media that have helped make a long poetic translation impossible” (224). In 
consequence, Logue imbues his translation with a “‘cinematic’ quality.”25 In his 
version of the Illiad, as the blurb on the book cover by Derek Mahon of The Observer 
makes clear, “The comparison isn’t with other poems, or even with prose, but with 
film: one is reminded of, say, Kurosawa’s Kagemusha;” or, as Alan Brien from the 
New Statesman, in another blurb that deliberately makes film a selling point for this 
edition, puts it: “Logue seems everywhere at once, like a camera in a helicopter, 
continually varying close-up and long shot, description and comment […] War Music 
is at once an ancient and a modern poem, a triumph of virtuoso rhetoric.”  
 
Thus, cinematic techniques like the establishing shot and the zoom become 
part of the very structure of the Logue translation. For instance, the opening lines of 
“Kings” are handled in this manner.  
 
Picture the east Aegean sea by night, 
And on a beach aslant its shimmering 
Upwards of 50,000 men 
Asleep like spoons beside their lethal Fleet./ 
Now look along that beach, and see […] 
 Then through the gate a naked man […] 
 Then kneel among those panes, burst into tears, and say:/ 
‘Mother, 
You said that you and God were friends. […]’ (7) 
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The wide shot of the sea gives way to a zoom that progressively moves closer (the 
beach; the gate) until we are given a close-up of the speaker, who we learn on the next 
page is Achilles. As Logue himself puts it in a medial mingling of theater and film: 
“There is no time to waste in a narrative poem.… Get the stuff on the stage. Stage the 
action… I think going to the cinema a lot, reading film scripts, and writing for 
cinema, has made this very clear to me.”26 It is tempting of course to see this update 
of Homer as a pandering to a modern media-savvy audience, especially in the passage 
that describes a duel between Menelaus and Paris, where the latter is knocked 
“backwards through the air” and Logue adds, “Bent like a gangster in his barber’s 
chair” (118). As Reynolds comments, phrases like this are likely to conjure up Francis 
Ford Coppola’s The Godfather with the double-edged effect that “we will see with 
our imagining eyes the film they call to mind” (228) and recognize the artificial 
mediatized overlay that imbues this translation of an ancient work with “ready-
formatted pictures from the push-button store of our cultural imaginary” (228). But 
this is not the point I wish to make here. Nor do I wish to suggest, as Christopher Reid 
does in his introduction to War Music, that the Illiad, because translated by a 
screenwriter, is cinematic for precisely this reason.27 Rather, I would like to take 
seriously a recollection by Logue from his autobiographical writings, unrelated to 
War Music, that describes how his “brain took on a life of its own:”  
 
I do not doubt those who say that when they have found themselves on the 
verge of a sudden, unexpected death, their past lives have flashed before their 
minds. This fractured, babbling film, projected inside my head, was akin to 
their experiences.28 
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This suggests, like the graphic illustrations of the heads in Figures 1-6, that mind 
cannot think outside media because it inhabits them. Media immerse and mediate, that 
is, they are immediate for us. While film is clearly part of our cultural imaginary, it is 
also a shaper of imaginations. Therefore, if mind is an effect of a given media culture, 
this suggests that media, like film, “no doubt also determine, and hence configure, our 
intellectual operations,”29 and this includes writing and translating. 
 
This is also true of T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, a famously fragmentary 
poem, which presents us with a “heap of broken images” (“Burial of the Dead”) and 
cacophony of voices. In this respect the poem draws on the two media of its day: 
cinema and radio. As Harriet Monroe already noted in 1923, a year after The Waste 
Land was published,  
 
this poem surprises with an effect of unstudied spontaneity. While stating 
nothing, it suggests everything that is in his rapidly moving mind, in a series 
of shifting scenes which fade in and out of each other like the cinema. The 
form, with its play of many-colored lights on words that flash from 
everywhere in the poet’s dream, is a perfect expression of the shifting tortures 
in his soul. (329-330) 
 
Monroe compares the metal processes of the poem’s speaking persona to the moving 
pictures. Similarly, the montage-like structure of the poem, even if not borrowed 
consciously from film art, is part of an early twentieth-century mind-set already 
rewired by the experience of railway-travel and cinema, both of which the cultural 
historian Wolfgang Schivelbusch associates with hasty, fragmentary and 
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impressionistic modes of seeing. Crucially then, what Monroe appears to be saying is 
that the content of this poem is another medium, film. This demonstrates that this is 
not a point that issues from McLuhan; rather, the theory issues from a long 
recognition of intermediality.  
 
Hummelt’s translation of The Waste Land as Das öde Land (2008) also brings 
film into the mix. In “The Fire Sermon” section of the poem, which spells out the 
effects of mechanization on the “human engine,” we meet a typist whose sexual 
encounter with a clerk has left her cold and dissatisfied: 
 
She turns and looks a moment in the glass,  
Hardly aware of her departed lover;  
Her brain allows one half-formed thought to pass:  
“Well now that’s done: and I’m glad it’s over.” 
When lovely woman stoops to folly and 
Paces about her room again, alone,  
She smoothes her hair with automatic hand,  
And puts a record on the gramophone. 
 
The line “When lovely woman stoops to folly” is from a song from the eighteenth-
century popular novel The Vicar of Wakefield. Hummelt translates it with a reference 
to the Hollywood film, Pretty Woman (1990) starring Julia Roberts: “Wenn Pretty 
Woman sich getäuscht hat” (“When Pretty Woman has fooled herself”). There is a 
mixture here of English and German, echoing the multiplicity of languages and 
intertextual quotations in The Waste Land; and the filmic is sutured into Eliot’s sonic 
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mediascape that is replete with echoes of songs, radios and gramophones. In 
Hummelt, aural memory of a song is re-recorded as visual memory of a film. This 
seemingly superficial change makes explicit a mediascape that was always implicit in 
the original. As Thomas Elsaesser has argued, “The cinema is part of us, it seems, 
even when we are not at the movies, which suggests that in this respect, there is no 
longer an outside to the inside: we are already ‘in’ the cinema with whatever we can 
say ‘about’ it!” (76) We are not only in the cinema, but the cinema is in us: as 
Elsaesser says this is the “cinema in our heads” (107). This is relevant here, precisely 
because what Hummelt shows us is that cinema was in the typist’s head, just as 
Monroe shows us that cinema was on the mind of the poem’s speaking persona. The 
changes that Hummelt makes to The Waste Land can be explained thus: there is no 
translation without mediation; but there is also no translation that is not the product of 
a prior intermedial relation. 
 
“And to make an end is to make a beginning”30 
The computer as a convergence medium, it is said, is “the medium to end all 
media.”31 This would spell the end of media history and bring intermediality to an 
end, to complete Babel. But this is not the trajectory I want to take. According to Alan 
Turing in 1950, a computer is a “universal” machine that can “mimic” any discrete 
machine. It is universal because there is no machine it cannot mimic, yet does nothing 
itself until some task is given to it. Any such task will therefore be a repetition of a 
task hitherto conducted by other machines or media. That makes digital media second 
order or meta-media, repeating – that is, remediating – the outputs and tasks once 
conducted in other media: book, film, etc. We can see this at play in innovative digital 
translation-works, such as by John Cayley or Young-Hae Chang Heavy Industries that 
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use the affordances of digital mediation to blur the lines between literature and film. 
Using morphing and flashing techniques derived from film and film-related media 
(photographic, tachistoscopic f.i.), these multilingual online translations make visible 
the translation process on the screen. By so doing they turn translation into a proto-
cinematic experience.  
 
What is new and innovative about these works is “therefore also old and 
familiar” insofar as “they promise the new by remediating what has gone before.”32 
But remediation does not exhaust the possibilities of the computer. Everything here 
hinges on the computer’s universality: because the computer is a universal machine, it 
repeats, that is, it instantiates the entire history of media in the present; but it also, 
precisely because it is a universal machine, contains within itself as yet uninstantiated 
media possibilities, which will be the future. To grasp the changes that translation is 
undergoing at this, or any other, moment in history therefore requires a comparative 
understanding of its relations to the mediascapes of the past, present, and future. It is 
not just that “we” inhabit a heavily mediated environment; rather, the lesson of the 
heads is the historical actuality of the remediations of mind. Media history has neither 
come to an end, nor does it exorcise spirit,33 but rather stages its intermedial odyssey.  
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Notes 
 
                                                
1  Anselm Kiefer’s “Acceptance speech” (9) for the 2008 Peace Prize of the German 
Book Trade, which for the first time was awarded to a fine artist. See 2008 Peace 
Prize Speeches: http://www.friedenspreis-des-deutschen-buchhandels.de/445950/ 
2  See http://www.art-magazin.de/kunst/52268/anselm_kiefer_bonn?cp=5 for a 
photograph of the sculpture exhibited in Bonn. 
3  See http://www.androgon.com/11678/kultur/kunst/anselm-kiefer-am-anfang for a 
close-up of the photo paper rolls. 
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4  When compared with Jakob Gautel’s book sculpture Babelturm (2006) or Marta 
Minujin’s La Torre de Babel Con Libros de Todo El Mundo (2011), both of which 
belong to a bibliographic imagination, Kiefer’s Babel sculptures – we might say – 
belong to a cinematic imagination. Put differently, Minujin’s sculpture, which was 
commissioned when UNESCO named Buenos Aires “World Capital of Books” for 
2011 and is comprised of 30,000 books in over 54 languages, celebrates the 
multiplicity of writings in different languages (rather than mourning the loss of one 
language) and with it the Book as a symbol of culture, by contrast, Kiefer’s Babel 
sculptures thematize the transitions between media cultures, which might be 
understood as a form of diachronic intermediality. 
5  For a critique of Jakobson’s notion of “translation proper,” see Jacques Derrida. 
“Des Tours de Babel.” Trans. Joseph F. Graham. Difference in Translation. Ed. 
Joseph F. Graham. Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 1985. 165-248. 
6  See Susan Bassnett, and André Lefevere, eds. Translation, History and Culture. 
London: Pinter, 1990. 
7  Karin Littau. “First Steps Towards A Media History Of Translation.” Translation 
Studies 4.3 (2011): 261-281. 
8  Robert Darnton. The Kiss of Lamourette. London: Faber and Faber, 1990; 
Guglielmo Cavallo, and Roger Chartier, eds. A History of Reading in the West. 
Trans. Lydia G. Cochrane. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.  
9  See Julian Murphet, and Lydia Rainford, eds. Literature and Visual Technologies: 
Writing after Cinema. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; David Seed, ed. 
Literature and the Visual Media. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2005; Laura Marcus, 
The Tenth Muse. Writing about Cinema in the Modernist Period. Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 2007; David Trotter, Cinema and Modernism. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007. 
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10  A fascinating example of intermedial translation is Angela Carter’s 1996 rendition 
of Lulu by Frank Wedekind, into which she weaves aspects of the play’s film 
adaptation by G. W. Pabst (1929) as well as film-historical and film-theoretical 
insights. 
11  Mention should be made here of some of the criticisms of McLuhan, namely that 
his work lacks a socially constitutive moment and that for this reason he cannot 
account for the socially constitutive moment from which he writes, hence a lack of 
reflexivity about his position. The point that his theory is largely unsubstantiated 
(that it is literary and avant-gardish rather than scholarly or empirical), however, 
may be answered by addressing the previous point. Since McLuhan is concerned 
with the medium being the “massage,” his probes consist precisely in a medium-
specific reflexivity as regards a given medium’s affordances, capacities, and 
constraints. Accordingly, McLuhan could be argued to be as reflexive as his 
investigations are specific. The real anxiety underlying such concerns has to do 
with technological determinism. However, as Iain Grant argues, this is a fear of 
determinism that requires but does not supply an appropriate address to the modes 
of causality. In consequence, Grant develops an account of technological 
determinism that is quite different to that which Raymond Williams, for instance, 
ascribes to McLuhan: deploying not the logic a mechanical causality but of non-
linear causality. See Grant, Chapter 5. “Cyberculture: Technology, Nature and 
Culture”. In Martin Lister, Martin et al., New Media: A Critical Introduction. 
London and New York: Routledge. 287-382. 
12  Kittler, “Preface”. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, xxxix  
13  For a field-defining anthology, see W.J.T Mitchell, and Mark B.N. Hansen, eds. 
Critical Terms for Media Studies. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2010. For a 
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precursor of the approaches in this anthology, see the seminal volume by Hans 
Ulrich Gumbrecht, and K. Ludwig Pfeiffer, eds. Materialities of Communication. 
Trans. W. Whobrey. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, which in large part 
is based on an earlier volume, Materialität der Kommunikation. Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988.  
14  For representative work in this field, see the Canadian journal Intermédialités: 
histoire et théorie des arts, des lettres et des techniques / Intermediality: History 
and Theory of the Arts, Literature and Technologies, and the substantial 600 page 
volume edited by Joachim Paech, and Jens Schröter, Intermedialität - Analog 
/Digital. Theorien – Methoden – Analysen. München: Wilhelm Fink, 2008. 
15  “Remediation” updates McLuhan’s point. More specifically, it is used by Bolter 
and Grusin to refer to the way in which one particular medium “appropriates the 
techniques, forms, and social significance of other media and attempts to rival or 
refashion them in the name of the real.” (99). It should also be noted that Bolter 
sees “remediation” as part of “the larger project of intermediality.” See 
“Remediation and the Language of New Media.” Northern Lights 5 (2007): 25-37 
(26). 
16  See Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. H. N. Fowler. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press & London, William Heinemann Ltd, 1925. 405-579; John Locke, An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. 104; 
Thomas de Quincey. Confessions of an Opium-Eater and Other Writings. Ed. by 
Robert Morrison. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 135. Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz. New Essays on Human Understanding. Abridged Edition. Trans. Peter 
Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
145. For two excellent works on metaphors of mind, see Jonathan Crary. 
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Techniques of the Observer. On Visions in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 1992, and Aleida Assmann, Erinnerungsräume. Formen und 
Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses. München: C.H. Beck, 1999. 
17  Kant cited by Lewis White Beck, On History, vii. 
18  See Schivelbusch. The Railway Journey, 42. 
19  See Michelle Bryner, “New Brain reads Minds.” 2010. Online at: 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39872780/ns/technology_and_science-
tech_and_gadgets/t/new-brain-machine-reads-minds/#.VRfgtEuvvHg 
20 Reproduced by kind permission of the illustrators of the graphics, Moran Cerf and 
Maria Moon. See Cerf et al. “On-line, Voluntary Control of Human Temporal 
Lobe Neurons.” Nature 467 (2010): 1104-1108. 
21 “Fully Upgradeable,” http://www.worth1000.com; “Computer Head 35 Photo,” 
http://www.dreamtime.com. 
22  As Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz point out in their “Translators’ 
Introduction” to Kittler’s Gramophone, Film, Typewriter: in Kittler’s work, 
“Heidegger’s notion of technology as Gestell, a supportive framing of human 
being, turns out to be an entire Ersatz for human being” (xxxiv). 
23  See Heidegger. On the Way to Language. Trans, Peter D. Hertz. New York: 
HarperCollins, 1982, where he says that “Metalanguage and sputnik, 
metalinguistics and rocketry are the Same” (58). 
24  The inverted quotations which frame “man” is a reference to Kittler’s recurring 
and derogatory refrain of “so-called Man” (16) in Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. 
It indicates that if minds are substantially changed then the contents of thoughts, 
such as what is “meaning” and what is “man,” must itself change. 
25  David Ricks, quoted in Reynolds, The Poetry of Translation, 224. 
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26  Logue, quoted in Reynolds, ibid., 225. 
27  Reid. “Introduction. Logue’s Homer, Homer’s Logue.” In Christopher Logue, War 
Music, Xi-xii (xii). 
28  Logue. Prince Charming, 156. 
29  Winthrop-Young and Wutz, xx.  
30  T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets (1943). 
31  Winthrop-Young and Wutz, xxx. 
32  Bolter and Grusin, 270. 
33  In this context, see Kittler, Austreibung des Geistes aus den Geisteswissenschaften. 
Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1980, which translated literally means Exorcism 
of the Spirit from the Spirit Sciences, but is perhaps best rendered in English as 
Driving-out of the Human from the Human Sciences. 
 
